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Definitions of Peace Journalism
There’s a war between the ones who say there is a
war
and the ones who say there isn’t.
(Leonard Cohen, There is a War)
1 Media  contribute  to  the  social  construction  of  reality,  on  one  hand,  by  introducing
specific topics into public discourse (agenda setting; McCombs & Shaw, 1972) and, on
another,  by  presenting  these  topics  (framing;  Goffman,  1974)  in  such  a  way  “as  to
promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or
treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman, 1993). 
2 Similarly, Jake Lynch & Annabel McGoldrick (2005) provided a compact formula for what
Peace Journalism (PJ) is about when they defined it as follows: 
“Peace Journalism is when editors and reporters make choices – of what stories to
report, and how to report them – which create opportunities for society at large to
consider and to value non-violent responses to conflict.”
3 As a formula for the aims of PJ, this definition is quite comprehensible. As a working
definition, however, it lacks precision and can easily be (mis)understood as a program of
advocacy journalism that requires active contributions by reporters to peaceful conflict
resolution (Loyn, 2008) and entails overstepping the thin line between journalism and
public relations (Hanitzsch, 2008).
4 As a consequence, (if not war) at least antagonism has broken out between those who
support the PJ concept and those who do not. Many journalists, such as David Loyn, fear
that  PJ  could  compromise  their  integrity  and  their  role  as  neutral  disseminators  of
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information, and they feel they are under attack when “the advocates of Peace Journalism
… lump everyone else together … as ‘War Journalists’” (Loyn, 2008, 61).
5 When Annabel  McGoldrick (2008)  launched her  attack on journalistic  objectivity,  the
situation worsened. Critics of PJ refused to give up the quality norms of journalism and
accused PJ of being the opposite of good journalism (Loyn, 2008).
6 Understanding myself  as  one of  the pioneers  of  PJ1,  I  must  admit  that  they are  not
completely wrong:  If  PJ  understands itself  as  an advocacy journalism that  disregards
journalistic quality norms, it is in danger of not only deteriorating into the opposite of
good journalism, but also of jeopardizing its own goals and becoming a Journalism of
Attachment.
7 Partisanship  in  the  name  of  peace,  creating  one’s  own  conflict  resolution  plan  and
designating an evildoer who is allegedly to blame for not adopting this plan – these can
easily promote enemy images and partisanship for those regarded as the victims of the
evildoers. Accordingly, it was no surprise when one of the most popular advocates of PJ
posted a couple of anti-Israeli blogs during the Gaza War.
 
The need for Peace Journalism
All we are saying is give peace a chance.
(John Lennon, Give Peace a Chance)
8 In  order  to  avoid  these  dangers,  I  propose  that  we  modify  Lynch  &  McGoldrick’s
definition as follows:
“Peace Journalism is when editors and reporters are aware of their contribution to
the construction of reality and of their responsibility to “give peace a chance.”
9 Even if we adopt this definition, however, the critics of PJ may still cling to the view that
PJ is at best meaningless (Loyn, 2008), or perhaps just old wine in new bottles (Hanitzsch,
2008), and they may still deny the need for PJ, “since most of the legal framework, and the
codes of  conduct  for  journalists,  written by trade unions and responsible employers,
provide a sufficient framework which prescribes what journalists can do and what they
cannot do” (Loyn, 2008).
10 Regarding  this  point,  however,  they  are  definitely  wrong.  The  codes  of  conduct  for
journalists  are  definitely  not sufficient  to  guarantee  high  quality  journalism  that  is
neutral, objective and unbiased.
• As countless media content analyses have demonstrated, the mainstream of war reporting
has an escalation-prone bias, and so-called quality journalism does not live up to its own
norms.
• Even though most journalists try to do a good job, they often fail and end up doing biased
reporting  and  – in  the  worst  case  – a  sort  of  conflict  coverage  which  looks  like  war
propaganda plain and simple.
11 Journalists don’t just report facts, they also give them meaning. And even if they try to
report truthfully, they can only write what they personally believe to be true. However,
journalists  are  members  of  society,  and  they  often  share  the  same  beliefs  as  other
members of their society.
12 Particularly in long-lasting intractable conflict, however, these societal beliefs include,
among  others,  beliefs  about  the  justness  of  one’s  cause,  one’s  victim  role,  the
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delegitimizing of the enemy and the defense of personal and national security through a
policy of strength.  According to Bar-Tal (1996),  it  can be assumed that these societal
beliefs can be found in any society engaged in intractable conflict, especially in those that
successfully cope with it. They are necessary for enduring intractable conflict, and any
nation  at  war,  therefore,  tries  to  create  and  maintain  these  beliefs  by  means  of
propaganda.
13 Nonetheless,  they are not just an ideology imposed on society from outside or by its
political leaders, nor are they just the result of misleading propaganda. They arise from a
long history of experiences with concrete conflicts at a high level of escalation, and they
are constituted as a generalized interpretation of these conflicts. Once these beliefs have
emerged in a society,  they provide a framework (war frame) that  literally interprets
every interaction with the opponent as another event in the great historical drama of the
struggle between “good” and “evil.”
14 In order to give peace a chance, journalists need to distance themselves from these beliefs
and replace them with a different interpretative frame (peace frame) that acknowledges
the justification (of at least some) of the interests of the other side, recognizes mutual
victim roles, ends the delegitimizing of the opponent and strives to achieve personal and
national security through a peaceful solution (Kempf, 2011b).
 
How Germans frame the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
He’s the Universal Soldier and he really is to
blame,
his orders come from far away no more,
they come from here and there and you and me.
(Buffy St. Marie, Universal Soldier)
15 The escalation dynamics of conflicts are decisively influenced by whether a conflict is
interpreted as a competitive or as a cooperative process. Competitive conflicts have a
tendency to expand and escalate and go together with typical misperceptions (Deutsch,
1973)  that  become motors  of  conflict  escalation and – in  the long-run (Kempf,  2003)
– solidify into the above-named societal beliefs. 
16 The members of a society directly affected by a conflict are not the only ones who develop
such beliefs. Outsiders trying to make sense of a conflict in which they are not themselves
engaged will also interpret it either in the sense of a peace frame (win-win model) or of a
war frame (win-lose model). How a person positions himself toward a conflict – which
side he takes, e.g.,  in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – thus depends essentially on the
mental model he forms of the conflict.
17 Particularly  in  Germany,  the  way  people  position  themselves  toward  the  Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is quite ambivalent, however. The World War II lesson of “never again
fascism, never again war” implies a tendency to adopt the Peace Frame (never again war).
But,  it  is  ambivalent  with  regard  to  human  rights.  “Never  again  fascism”  can  be
interpreted in two ways:
• as  support  for  the  victims  of  National  Socialism,  which  implies  a  tendency  toward
unconditional solidarity with Israeli policy and a weakening of the peace frame. This can go
so far that it turns into a war frame: (never again fascism, therefore war), as was the case (in
part) in 1990/91 Gulf War discourse (Kempf, 1994), or 
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• as support for human rights worldwide, which implies rejecting at least some aspects of Israeli
policy and includes solidarity with the Israeli peace movement and at least a certain degree
of empathy with the Palestinian side. Although this tends to strengthen the peace frame, it
also poses the danger of adopting the war frame and siding with the Palestinians.
18 The results of a recent survey (Kempf, 2011a) demonstrate that this danger is quite real.
One of the aims of the survey was to reconstruct the mental models according to which
people in Germany interpret the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Starting from the conception
that mental models have not only a cognitive, but also an affective aspect, we designed
three separate scales for participants’ “concern about the conflict,” their perception of
the  “ambivalence  of  war  and  peace”  for  both  Israelis  and  Palestinians,  and  their
“positioning with regard to the conflict.” As a first step, we identified typical response
patterns  for  each  of  the  three  scales,  and  in  a  second  step,  we  then  inferred  the
participants’  mental  models  by identifying the meta-patterns in which they combine
concern, ambivalence and positioning.
19 Concern: The results of the survey showed that the more they are concerned, the better
the participants consider their knowledge of the conflict to be. The more participants feel
affected by the conflict, the fewer there are who do not feel attached to one side or the
other, the more there are who have visited Israel and/or the Palestinian territories, the
more there are who have had personal contact with Israelis and/or Palestinians, and the
more there are who have Israeli and/or Palestinian friends, relatives or acquaintances.
20 Ambivalence: With increasing concern, participants’ sensitivity for the ambivalence of war
and peace changes from empathy for Israel’s  security dilemma via uncertainty about
whether peace can offer Israel security, to recognizing the ambivalence of peace for both
parties, to regarding the status quo as the lesser evil for Israel, to naive pacifism: “peace
is good, war is evil,” and finally to uncertainty as to whether war is really very bad for the
Palestinians.
21 Positioning: At the same time, the dominant position participants take to the conflict shifts
from no position at all via an ambivalent peace frame with sympathy for Israel to an
ambivalent peace frame with sympathy for the Palestinians, to a polarization between a
pro-Israeli war frame, pro-Palestinian peace frame and a pro-Palestinian war frame.
22 From this point on, the participants’ positions switch to the Palestinian side: The (mainly)
naive pacifists interpret the conflict according to a pro-Palestinian peace frame on the
edge of a war frame, and the participants who are most concerned about the conflict and
–  at  the  same  time  –  do  not  fear  that  Palestinian  violence  is  an  obstacle  to  the
establishment of a Palestinian state interpret the conflict according to a pro-Palestinian
war frame.
23 Comparing the results of our representative study with those of a (non-representative)
pilot study, we also found that there was a dramatic shift in the way participants position
themselves to the conflict. From one year after the Gaza war (November 2009 – February
2010), when the data for the pilot study were collected, to the months after the Israeli
navy’s seizure of the Free Gaza ship (June 2010 – November 2010), when the data for the
survey were collected, the share of participants who interpreted the conflict according to
a pro-Palestinian peace frame decreased dramatically, and instead there arose a group of
participants who interpreted the conflict according to a pro-Palestinian war frame. In our
pilot study, we did not find any such group.
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How to do Peace Journalism
And brothers can’t you see,
this is not the way we put the end to war.
(Buffy St. Marie, Universal Soldier)
24 If journalists are to give peace a chance, they need some easy-to-follow guidelines for how
to do this, and for many journalists and peace researchers, Galtung’s (1998, 2002) famous
table  which  contrasts  PJ  with  conventional  war  journalism  seems  to  offer  such  a
guideline. As a guideline, however, it has some crucial shortcomings:
• It creates a simple dualism between PJ, on the one hand, and War Journalism, on the other.
• It only describes the outcome of the two approaches.
• It does not tell us how to reach our goal.
25 Both the antagonism between those who subscribe to PJ and those who do not, and the
tendency  to  understand  PJ  as  a  variant  of  advocacy  journalism  that  deliberately
disregards  the  norms of  quality  journalism are  simply  logical  consequences  of  these
shortcomings.
26 PJ should be employed, but it is not helpful to expect journalists to distance themselves
from the dominant beliefs of their society. Societal beliefs are part of a society’s ethos,
and they are also part of the psychological infrastructure that enables societal members
to hold up under the stress of war (Bar-Tal, 1996). They construct society members’ views
of conflict in a way that seemingly proves the truth of the stereotypes and prejudices that
foster these views (Kempf, 2003), and the only way to break out of this vicious circle is to
learn to accept the facts before they are interpreted (Martin-Baró, 1991).
27 Only if a society does this can conflicts that persist after a peace treaty or that arise
during peace processes be understood in a way that gradually overcomes prejudices and
transforms  a  war  culture  into  a  more  constructive  social  contract  between  former
enemies.
• The  first  rule  for  journalists  who  aim  to  facilitate  such  a  process  of  social  learning,
therefore, is to mistrust the superficially plausible.
• And the second rule is to ask the right questions. 
28 A peace or reconciliation discourse is not a discourse about peace or reconciliation, and
especially not a discourse that harmonizes contradictions or suppresses conflicts. It is a
matter of how to deal with conflict. Correspondingly, the best way to characterize the
various discourse forms in which journalists may engage is in terms of the questions they
focus on.
• In war discourse, it is a matter of “Who is guilty?” and “How can they be stopped?”
• Peace discourse asks, “What is the problem?” and “How can it be solved?”
• And when a reconciliation discourse is appropriate, the focus is on questions such as “Who is
the other?” and “How can we meet each other with mutual respect?”
29 The choice of a suitable discourse form is essential for the developmental dynamics of
peace processes, and – as Lea Mandelzis (2007) has shown in the case of the Oslo Process –
mistakes in choosing a discourse form can easily create overly optimistic expectations.
Their  disappointment can spread ill-feeling in the population and ultimately has the
consequence that the discourse turns into a renewed war discourse.
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30 For this very reason, it would be inappropriate to engage in a reconciliation discourse
during the ‘hot’ phase of a conflict. If journalists manage to maintain a critical distance
from belligerents of every stripe and make the public aware of the high price violent
conflict imposes on all participants, they have already accomplished a lot. Proposals for
solutions are a delicate matter at this stage of a conflict, however, and there is a risk that
societal  members  will  rashly  dismiss  coverage  as  implausible  or  as  hostile  counter-
propaganda. Therefore, in this phase the chief aim can only be to find a way out of the
fixation  on  violence  and  mutual  destruction  and  to  alert  the  public  to  an  external
viewpoint that can deconstruct the conflict parties’ antagonistic conceptions of reality.
31 Once this is accomplished and the parties no longer automatically perceive every voice
for moderation as hostile, PJ may enter into a constructive process and focus coverage on
the question of how to start peace processes and how to build peace.
 
How the German quality press frames the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict
And he knows he shouldn’t kill,
and he knows he always will.
(Buffy St. Marie, Universal Soldier)
32 In every escalating conflict, there comes a point when the parties start to seek allies and
to divide the world into those who are “for us” and those who are “against us.” PJ doesn’t
have  any  easy  solutions  for  such  situations.  Quality  journalism cannot  refrain  from
reporting issues  that  are  unfavorable  to  one party  or  the  other  and,  in  the light  of
increasing sympathy for the Palestinian cause in the German public, it is not surprising
that German media are often accused of providing one-sided reportage on the Middle East
conflict  and  displaying  narrow  partisanship  for  the  Palestinian  position  (cf.  Anti-
Defamation League, 2002; Jäger & Jäger, 2003; Wistrich, 2004; Krämer, 2010).
33 Criticism like this should not be taken lightly.  In order to decide whether there is  a
growing pro-Palestinian bias in the German media,  we compared the coverage of the
second Intifada and the Gaza War in the big five German national quality papers which
cover the entire political spectrum and are generally regarded as representative for the
German media landscape (cf. Wilke, 1999): Die Welt (DW), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
(FAZ), Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), Frankfurter Rundschau (FR) and Die Tageszeitung (taz).
34 The results of our study (cf. Maurer & Kempf, 2011) demonstrated that media coverage of
both conflicts was much more complex and differentiated than assumed by critics, and
during the Gaza War the German quality press likewise did its best to avoid taking the
Palestinian side.
35 The press  tried hard to  satisfy  the quality  norms of  journalism and to  report  in  an
objective and detached manner. In many regards, it maintained a uniform distance from
both conflict parties, it was quite critical of both sides’ policies, and it tried to make clear
the pluralism of both societies. 
36 Nonetheless, the coverage of the two wars did not really live up to PJ as defined above,
and  the  results  of  our  study  showed  the  negative  impact  of  the  news  selection
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mechanisms  that  Galtung  blamed  for  the  escalation-prone  bias  of  conventional  war
journalism as early as 1998.
• Due to the news factor “social, cultural, historical proximity,” more was reported on the
Israelis than on the Palestinians. Only with regard to victims (and due to the actual number
of victims) did the German papers report less about Israel than about the Palestinians. 
• Due to the news factor “negativism,” German coverage was dominated by negative news. It
focused on the employment  of  force,  the  victims of  violence,  as  well  as  on the conflict
parties’ confrontational and threatening behavior and thus put not only the Palestinians,
but also Israel in a bad light.
37 In this context, Israeli actions were more often criticized than those of the Palestinians.
Israel’s strength and confidence of victory, competitive logic, its confrontational behavior
and threats to it were more often reported than on the Palestinian side. This makes Israel
appear extremely powerful and uncompromising and could possibly favor a “David versus
Goliath” image that encourages solidarity with the Palestinians.
38 Trying  to  provide  balanced  reportage,  however,  the  German  media  neutralized  this
negative effect by displaying a measure of understanding for Israeli policies, so that on
balance Israel came off looking better than the Palestinians.
• Israel was more frequently portrayed in a defensive position than were the Palestinians, and
the threat to Israel was more often thematized. 
• Israeli actions were more often justified, Israel’s rights were more often acknowledged, and
not  only  Israel’s  cooperative  behavior,  but  also  its  readiness  for  cooperation  were
thematized more often.
39 Due to the different nature of the two wars, during the Gaza War the reportage situation
tended to shift in favor of the Palestinians, however. 
• There were more frequent reports on threats to the Palestinians and on Palestinian victims
than during the second Intifada, and the calculation and comparison of victim statistics was
more frequent.
• Cooperative  behavior,  offers  of  cooperation  and  threatening  behavior  were  less  often
thematized for both sides, and the focus of the reportage shifted to Israeli use of force, on
the one side, and confrontational Palestinian (political) measures, on the other. 
• While  the focus  on Palestinian use  of  force  declined during the Gaza War in  favor  of  a
competitive logic and confrontational behavior, during the Gaza War Israeli use of force was
focused on about twice as often as during the second Intifada. Thereby an impression was
given  of  an  increasing  asymmetry  between  Israel’s  (excessive)  use  of  force  and  the
Palestinian’s (mere) political confrontation.
40 Thus, the media image of Israeli actions during the Gaza War was more negative than
during the second Intifada,  and that  of  Palestinian actions,  in  contrast,  not  quite  as
negative  as  previously.  This  partial  leveling  of  the  differences  between  the
representations of the two parties’ actions was, however, probably due more to the facts
and the specific characteristics of the two wars than to bias in favor of the Palestinians. 
41 Quite to the contrary, differences in German reportage on the two wars indicate a clear
tendency to tone down a reporting situation unfavorable to Israel.
• Also, during the Gaza War, Israel’s behavior was still less negatively represented than that of
the Palestinians.
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• Israel’s seemingly excessive use of force was balanced with reportage that justified Israeli
actions,  increasingly  represented  Israel  as  taking  a  defensive  position  and  less  often
thematized Israel’s superior military power. 
• To be sure, the frequency of justifications of both conflict parties’ actions decreased during
the  Gaza  War,  but  the  judgment  of  Israeli  intentions  and  actions  did  not  change  in
comparison with the second Intifada and also remained largely positive during the Gaza
War. 
• Instead, reportage on events that could turn readers against Israel was counteracted by a
negative shift in the evaluation of Palestinian intentions and actions.
• Thereby the imbalance between the two parties increased in favor of Israel. Whereas during
the second Intifada Israeli behavior was justified somewhat more than twice as often, during
the Gaza War this rose to four-and-a-half times as often.
42 This asymmetry between increased portrayal of Israeli use of force, on the one side, and
increased justification of Israeli actions, on the other, is also mirrored in the punctuation
of the conflict and the representation of its victims.
• Thus, during the Gaza War reportage on victims and numbers of victims admittedly shifted
in  favor  of  the  Palestinians,  but  this  was  counteracted  in  that  Israel  (relative  to  the
Palestinians)  was  increasingly  represented  in  a  defensive  position,  and  Israel’s  superior
military force was (relatively) less often thematized.
• Although the amount of coverage devoted to the two sides was not as dramatically unequal
as during the second Intifada, during the Gaza War the threat to Israel was still represented
more than twice as frequently as that to the Palestinians. 
• And although both parties were less often represented in a defensive position during the
Gaza War,  the ratio  between the two parties  shifted in favor of  Israel.  While  Israel  was
represented twice as often in a defensive position during the second Intifada, this rose to
more than three times as often during the Gaza War.
43 Summarizing these results, we can state that the coverage of the German quality press
did not meet the standards of PJ.
• While the press aimed at objective, detached and balanced coverage, it tended to follow the
pattern of conventional war reporting (cf. focus on violence and confrontational behavior),
which did not really give peace a chance but merely put both sides in a bad light. 
• Moreover,  the  particular  way  the  press  tried  to  balance  coverage  during  the  Gaza  War
produced a tension between a reportage situation that could favor pro-Palestinian solidarity
among readers, on the one side, and a framing of the reportage that was favorable to Israel,
on the other.
44 On the background of German-Jewish history and precaution against the rise of a “new”
Israel-centered anti-Semitism, this way of “balancing” is quite understandable. But it may
also  provoke  a  backlash  and  even  make  existing  latent  anti-Semitic  prejudices  and
stereotypes salient:  Prejudices from the repertoire of latent anti-Semitism – e.g.,  “One
[i.e., the German press] is not allowed to say what one really thinks about the Jews.” – or
insinuations from the repertoire of manifest anti-Semitism – e.g., “International Jewry has
a firm grip on the German press and dictates how it has to report.”
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How the German public copes with media frames
You don’t believe in war, 
but what’s that gun you’re totin’?’
(P. F. Sloan, Eve of Destruction)
45 According to the present state of framing research, media frames do not have a linear
effect on public opinion. The effects of framing result more from the interaction between
media frames and the a priori mental models (individual frames) with which people make
sense of the issues covered by the media. Depending on the recipients’ mental models,
partisan war journalism may also produce a backlash, and consequently we should not be
overly optimistic about the potentially positive effects of PJ.
46 In a recent experiment (cf. Kempf & Thiel, 2012) we confronted the participants in six
experimental  groups  with  differently  framed reports  on  either  Israeli  or  Palestinian
violence: A Palestinian suicide attack in Tel Aviv in April 2006 and an Israeli military
operation in the Gaza Strip at the end of February and beginning of March 2008. 
47 Using original material from the German quality press and based on Kempf’s (2003) model
of escalation- vs. de-escalation oriented conflict coverage, each of these scenarios was
framed either 
• according  to  an  escalation  oriented  pro-Israeli  war  frame  which  condemns  Palestinian
violence and/or justifies Israeli actions, or
• according  to  an  escalation  oriented  pro-Palestinian  war  frame  which  condemns  Israeli
violence and/or justifies Palestinian actions, 
• or according to a de-escalation oriented peace frame which focuses on the costs of war for
both sides. 
48 In accordance with previous studies (cf. Bläsi et al.,  2005; Spohrs, 2006; Schäfer, 2006;
Möckel,  2007),  the  results  of  the  experiment  were  quite  encouraging  for  PJ.  The
participants generally evaluated the peace frames as more understandable, less biased,
more balanced and more impartial.
49 Nonetheless, these effects were not uniform.
• Due to their sensitivity to the propaganda function of reports about violence and victims (cf.
Herman & Chomsky,  1988),  participants  who positioned  themselves  according  to  a  pro-
Palestinian war frame (or on the edge of one) rejected reports about Palestinian violence as
biased in favor of Israel, and conversely, those who interpreted the conflict according to a
pro-Israeli  war  frame  rejected  reports  about  Israeli  violence  as  biased  in  favor  of  the
Palestinians. 
• As  well,  participants  dismissed  media  frames  that  were  incompatible  with  their  own
positioning to the conflict as less understandable, more biased and partisan in favor of the
opposing side.
• Moreover,  even participants  who themselves  interpret  the conflict  according to a  peace
frame projected the Israel-friendly bias of German mainstream coverage onto the media
peace frame and regarded it as somewhat biased in favor of Israel.
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Summary
50 Summarizing both the theoretical considerations and the empirical studies that I have
presented in this paper, I conclude that the norms of quality journalism are a necessary
but not sufficient condition for the production of quality journalism during conflicts and
crises. In order to give peace a chance, 
• journalists need to refrain from the media’s focus on negative news
• they need to refrain from a superficial balancing of their reports, and
• they need to mistrust the superficially plausible, refrain from oversimplification and ask the
right questions.
51 If  they  succeed,  they  will  find  an  audience  that  appreciates  their  coverage  as  more
understandable and less biased, more impartial and more balanced than conventional
war reporting. 
52 Nonetheless, we should not be over-optimistic about the beneficial effects of PJ. In an
antagonistic situation where society members have already made up their minds as to
who is good and who is bad, journalists must be aware that news recipients who already
side with one party or the other may reject the peace frame as less understandable and
more biased in favor of the opposing party.
53 Moreover,  in  an  antagonistic  situation  like  this,  PJ  risks  coming  under  fire  from
belligerents on all sides and, therefore, requires great courage on the side of journalists.
Nonetheless, PJ is a worthwhile endeavor, and in the long-run it may contribute to a
society’s co-construction of reality in a more beneficial and productive way.
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NOTES
*. Paper  presented  at  the  conference  on  “The  dynamics  of  images  in  the  Israeli-Palestinian
conflict”  in  Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv,  Nov.  7-8,  2011.  Funded by the German Research Society
(Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft – DFG), grant No KE 300/8-1.
1. The  first  version  of  my  PJ  model  (Kempf,  1996,  2008)  was  published  two  years  prior  to
Galtung’s (1998, 2008).
ABSTRACTS
The  present  paper  discusses  the  potentials  and  limitations  of  Peace  Journalism  (PJ)  and
exemplifies them with the results of (1) a recent survey of the mental models (individual frames)
according to which Germans interpret the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, (2) a comparative analysis
Peace Journalism, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the German press and the ...
Bulletin du Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem, 23 | 2012
12
of the German press coverage of the second Intifada and the Gaza War, and (3) an experimental
study on how the German public copes with the frames that are offered by the media.
Cette présentation discute le potentiel et les limites du "journalisme de paix" (peace journalism).
Elle s’appuie sur des travaux récents. 1. Les résultats d’une enquête sur les modèles mentaux
(cadres individuels) avec lesquels les Allemands interprètent le conflit israélo-palestinien. 2. Une
analyse comparée de la couverture par la presse allemande de la seconde Intifada et de la guerre
de Gaza de 2008-9. 3. Une étude expérimentale de la façon dont le public allemand négocie les
cadres (frames) qui lui sont proposés par ses médias. 
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